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Seller Channel Choice and Optimal Pricing on Heterogeneous 
Platforms under Online Price Comparison System 
Qingfang Sang 
1
School of Business and Administration, 
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law 
Wuhan, 430073, China 
 
Abstract: This paper studies the channel choice and pricing strategy for sellers who are facing heterogeneous e-commerce 
platforms under the price comparison system. In such a system, consumers can see the sales information of the same product 
on different platforms, so they will compare and choose between different sellers and platforms. This paper portrays the 
behaviors of consumer's price comparing and builds a decision model of sellers in different channel selection modes which 
are based on the demand functions of consumer utility and Hotelling model. The optimal pricing and maximum profit of the 
sellers in different selection patterns will be obtained by solving the model and the final results can provide a 
decision-making reference for sellers who are in the face of similar situations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid development of electronic commerce and Internet new technology, online shopping has 
become a trend and the various e-commerce platforms have also swarmed. These platforms provide a complete 
network infrastructure and online services to enable both parties to complete the entire transaction. In fact, 
different platforms also have different operating modes, they can be simply divided into two categories: one is 
the open platform, which does not charge the seller and the buyer’s any fees, such as Taobao. The other is the 
for-profit platform, which will charge buyer and seller’s a certain transaction costs in order to achieve better 
transaction protection and the perfect customer service, such us Tmall,Amazon
[1]
. In addition, consumers tend to 
have different degrees of acceptance of the platform, this can be comprehended from the following two 
aspects:(1)In terms of enterprise scale, reputation and sales, the entrance threshold of for-profit platform is 
higher than that of open e-commerce platform, so consumers tend to choose the for-profit platform that can 
provide higher quality goods.(2) The for-profit platform often provides a more perfect consumer protection 
mechanism than open e-commerce platform, which enables consumers to enjoy a more perfect shopping 
experience. At the same time, the changes in consumer shopping habits promote them to find products with 
good quality and low price, and there are a lot of online price comparison plug-ins now. These browser plug-ins 
can help consumers to observe the price of multiple online platforms with the same series of products, including 
the recent price movements, so consumers can select the most suitable items. For sellers, they are not 
independent of the sales process, the existence of these plug-ins makes the market competition more intense. 
The platform selection mode and pricing strategy of competitors will affect other sellers’ decisions, so this paper 
focuses on the following questions:(1)How does the seller choose the channel when they are facing the 
heterogeneous e-commerce platform? (2)How does the competitors’ decision affect other sellers’ decisions? (3) 
How does the consumer's price comparison behavior affect the seller's decision? (4) How to determine the 
optimal pricing in the established selected pattern? 
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The issue of channel choice and price strategy has always been the focus of academic research at home and 
abroad. In fact, some scholars focus on online channel, because the open platform and for-profit platform also 
have their own characteristics, we can see the heterogeneous platforms as two channels
[2]-[3]
.With the popularity 
of online shopping, more and more sellers prefer to set up shop on the high-quality e-commerce 
platforms
[1]
.Bilateral markets are also should be paid attention to it, Armstrong focuses on the competition in the 
bilateral market and discussed the equilibrium pricing under the different choice modes between the monopoly 
platform and the competitive platform
[4]
. In addition, many scholars also pay attention to the sellers’ pricing 
strategy under the dual channel, Chiang,Dumrongsiri and Cai follows closely about the optimal pricing of the 
various stakeholders in the supply chain when both online and traditional physical stores exist
[5]-[7]
. In addition, 
some scholars also concern the pricing issues under the state of competition, Lin(2006)investigates the impact of 
value-added services on the sellers’ optimal prices and their own needs, he also extends the model into many 
competitive sellers
[8]
. Under the background of stochastic demand, Cao considers the pricing and coordination 
problems of closed loop supply chain when two sellers are competing, and made specific analysis in two cases 
of centralized decision and decentralized decision respectively
[9]
. In the study process, the influence of the 
heterogeneity of consumers on sellers’ decision also can’t be ignored. Chen divides the consumers into strategic 
and short-sighted types, and analyzes the dynamic game pricing in the process of multiple sellers’ price 
war
[10]
.Wang also studies the impact of strategic consumers and short-sighted consumers on retailer pricing and 
inventory strategy
[11]
. Besides, Zhang shows the optimal strategy of digital product supply chain based on 
consumer preference
[12]
. Anyway, the research on network price comparison has received more attention in 
recent years. Bai analyzes the influence of the proportion of price comparison to consumers of manufacturers 
and retailers in a two-level supply chain system that composed by a manufacturer and a seller
[13]
. Shi considers 
the effect of retailer risk aversion on manufacturer channel selection under the network price comparison
[14]
. 
And Li discusses the pricing problem of online sellers under the price comparison behavior of strategic 
consumers and gave the optimal pricing of online sellers under dynamic pricing and price promises 
respectively
[15]
. Shen considers the pricing and coordination strategy of dual channel under the behavior of 
network price comparison, and use game theory to discuss the decision model of single channel and dual 
channel supply chain
[16]
. Deng explores the pricing strategy of sellers when adopting dual channel and showed 




Actually, there are few studies based on consumer network price behavior, and current studies mainly focus 
on dual channels. The channel choice and pricing of sellers when are facing two heterogeneous platforms is 
rarely studied, this paper depicts the price behavior of consumers and shows the decision-making model of two 
competing sellers. The optimal pricing and profit of the sellers in different decision-making modes will be 
obtained after analysis, which will provide a reference for sellers. 
 
2. BASIC MODEL 
 
2.1 Model description 
There are two heterogeneous e-commerce platforms: ,, BA A is the for-profit platform and charges bfsf , to 
seller and consumer respectively, the fees are mainly used for the maintenance of the platform, the guarantee of 
the products and the protection of consumers’ rights. B is the open platform and charges no fees. The various 
mechanisms are provided by the A platform, which make it easier and more secure for consumers to buy. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the basic purchasing utility is v in the A platform and v in the B platform for 
consumers. v is the consumer valuation and is uniformly distributed within the consumer population from 0 to 1, 
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with a density of 1,and  is called the customer acceptance of the open platform. The model in this paper is 
developed for those products with ]1,0[ . 
Sellers can enter the open platform at any time because of the low entrance threshold and it’s assumed that 
two sellers, 2,1 ss already exist on the open platform before. But the for-profit platform A adopts the way of 
directional investment, only those who have successfully entered the platform brand pool can apply for entry. 
The aim of this measure is to cooperate with good brands, control product quality indirectly and provide good 
services for consumers. Assuming that platform A appears on the market now, 1s has successfully entered the 
platform brand pool through the application, but 2s has failed to enter the brand pool for its own reasons, so 2,1 ss
can choose the modes as: 
(1) 2,1 ss only settle on the B platform;  
(2) 1s settles on the A and B platform at the same time, and 2s settles only on the B platform.. 
Besides, assuming that A and B platform have its loyal consumers respectively, and the proportion of loyal 
customers is AN , BN accordingly. Customers often search platform products through the keywords, and be ready 
to pay after comparison between different sellers. At this time, the price plug-ins will show the price information 
of the same good on the other website, then consumers will decide whether to jump to another website to 
purchase, so the decision order of sellers and customers is as follows:  
(1) The seller sets the selling price under different choices; 
(2) Consumers first choose between different products, then choose between different platforms after observing 
the price information. 
Using the Hotelling model to describe the consumer's choice between sellers on the same platform, and the 









iAq ,the demand of sellers on the B platform at the same time is similar. 
The parameters description are as follows: 
 




The pricing of 2,1 ss on the BA, platform, respectively 
Customers’ acceptance of the open platform 
t  The search cost for consumers accessing the Internet 
bfsf ,  Fees charged to the sellers and the consumers by the for-profit platform, respectively 






The demand of 2,1 ss on the BA, platform and the market share of 2,1 ss on A or B  
 
21, ss   
The total profit of 2,1 ss respectively 
 
2.2 Scenarios discussion 
2.2.1 Scenario 1: 21, ss sell product on the B platform only  
When the loyal consumers on the B platform decide to buy product from }2,1{, iis ,the basic utility needs to 
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satisfy }2,1{,0  ipv iB , v is the consumption value. According to the consumer choice model, the number of 










Consumers will choose between the competing }2,1{, iis on the B platform and the Hotelling model can be 
used to get the market share of the sellers, so the number of consumers from B platform is willing to choose










The profit of }2,1{, iis selling goods on the B platform is: 
)( iiBiBiB cpQ   
      






       
  
         
 Assuming that 0ic ,after the partial derivative and analysis, the optimal pricing and profits are as follows, 
          
 
 






























Proposition 1 The optimal pricing and profit for sellers in scenario 1 is:          
 
 






























Proposition 1 shows that when 2,1 ss sell on the open platform only, the optimal pricing and profit of them is 
related to consumers’ acceptance of the open platform and the online search costs and is positive correlated with 
both. 
 
2.2.2 Scenario 2: 1s sells product on the A and B platform, 2s sells product on the B platform only 
According to the idea of backward induction, the consumer's decision on the platform choice should be 
first expressed. Because 1s sells product on the A and B platform, 2s sells product on the B platform only, the loyal 
consumers of the A platform can only buy 1s goods on the A platform, and there is no other brand choice. They 
just have to decide to buy on A or B platform, if they decide to buy on the A platform, the following conditions 
should be satisfied: 
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If they decide to buy on the A platform, the following conditions should be satisfied: 
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After the analysis, the number of loyal customers from A platform decides to buy from 1s on A is: 
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(3) 
 
The number of loyal customers from platform A decides to buy from 1s on B is: 
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(4) 
If consumers from B want to choose 1s ,they will see the price information of 1s product on the BA, platform 
through the price comparison system and then decide to buy from A or B .So if consumers are willing to buy the 
product of 1s on A ,the condition should satisfy like(1),the demand     
 
is similar to(3),and if consumers are 
willing to buy the product of 1s on B ,the condition should satisfy like(2),the demand     
 
is similar to(4). 
Besides,since 2s sells product on the platform B only, consumers who want to buy from 2s can conclude 2s on the 
platform B through the price comparison system and will go to the platform B totally. 
According to the idea of backward induction, now it is necessary to determine the consumers’ choice from 
platform A and B on the product brands 1s and 2s . As 2,1 ss sell on the platform B in scenario1, the ratio of 




       
  
, and because there is only 1s on 
the platform A , customers on platform A will buy from 1s totally, so they just need to make a decision on which 
platform to buy the product. 





































































The profits brought to 2s by consumers buying goods through the B platform are as follows: 












, the final profit of 1s can be solved as 01 s ,this is the case that 1s does not want to see, so 
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, the final pricing can be obtained after solving: 
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( M is meaningful) 
The equilibrium solutions under this model need to satisfy the following conditions: 
   
 
    , 110  Ap , }2,1{,0  iiBp   
So the parameters need to satisfy the following conditions in order to make the solutions exist: 
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So the final optimal price and profit of 21, ss are: 
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Proposition 2 The optimal price and profit of sellers in scenario 2 is influenced by various parameters, different 
range of parameters will determine the final pricing and profit. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper studies the channel choice and pricing strategy of sellers facing heterogeneous platforms under the  
price comparison system. We show the optimal pricing strategy and the maximum profit of 1s and 2s when they sell 
goods on the B platform as well as 1s on the A , B platform and 2s on B platform. The research shows that when 1s and 
2s only sell goods on the B platform, the optimal pricing strategy and profit of 1s , 2s are affected by two factors, that 
is the acceptance of consumers to B platform and the online search cost of consumers. And when 1s is on the A , B
platform at the same time and 2s is on the B platform, the optimal pricing decision of the sellers is different  under 
different parameters range. The future research needs to compare the profits of the two sellers in two scenarios and 
get the optimal decision combination of them through numerical analysis. 
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